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I. Introduction
In the spring of 2016, a group of developers 
put forth a proposal for a decentralized 
autonomous organization (DAO — this term and 
others will be explained below). The purpose of 
this DAO, which was called “The DAO,” was to 
collect funds for investment in new ventures. The 
investors, through the Ethereum blockchain 
platform (upon which The DAO was constructed), 
would decide where The DAO’s funds would be 
invested and would share in the profits of the 
enterprise.1
Unfortunately, a programming error left open 
the possibility for The DAO’s funds to be diverted 
to a rogue individual’s account. This did indeed 
happen, and perhaps one-third of The DAO’s 
funds were diverted. To mitigate the potential 
effects of a diversion, the Ethereum community 
voted to have a “hard fork” of the Ethereum chain, 
creating two Ethereum chains into the future.2
To add insult to injury, the SEC used this DAO 
to explain for the first time its view that some 
blockchain-related issuances would be considered 
securities subject to SEC regulation.3
Although this specific DAO wasn’t successful, 
entrepreneurs continue to use the blockchain 
structure to raise funds and deploy those funds 
for the benefit of their investors. It has been 
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1
Christopher Jentzsch, “The History of The DAO and Lessons 
Learned,” Slock.it blog, Aug. 24, 2016.
2
Id.
3
SEC Release No. 81207 (July 25, 2017).
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suggested that such a structure could be used to 
create the equivalent of corporations.4 Several 
DAOs have already been formed.5
Absent from the discussion of DAOs is any 
consideration of how these new structures mesh 
with the U.S. tax system. An examination of what 
constitutes a DAO quickly reveals that there are 
significant tax issues raised by these structures. 
By describing how The DAO was intended to 
function, I hope to make clear what these issues 
are.
II. DAOs and Their Terminology
A. The Blockchain
Many have written about the blockchain, 
particularly because Bitcoin, blockchain’s initial 
application,6 has grabbed the public’s 
imagination. The following description, while 
incomplete, is intended to make the discussion of 
DAOs understandable to those previously 
unfamiliar with them.
Traditionally, if a system is to keep track of the 
ownership of assets, it needs a central authority to 
record ownership and thus provide assurance to 
the owners and potential purchasers that the 
property is really there and that ownership can be 
transferred uniquely. Think, for example, of a 
government agency with which land ownership 
must be recorded, a corporation whose stock 
ledger keeps track of its shareholders, or a bank 
that records the funds in its depositors’ accounts.
The blockchain dispenses with the need for a 
central authority by making public the ledger 
showing the assets within its domain. In the 
classic blockchain, no one viewing this ledger 
would be able to identify the owner of any of the 
assets listed in the ledger. However, using 
cryptographic methods, only the owner of the 
asset can transfer it to another person. The owner 
has a “digital key” (which is like a password or 
PIN) that can uniquely be used to transfer the 
asset. Thus, the owner can show a potential buyer 
that the asset exists, because it is listed in the 
publicly available ledger. The person claiming to 
be the owner then proves ownership by being able 
to transfer the item to the transferee’s account.
A crucial aspect of this system is that for the 
transfer to be accepted by the community 
participating in this system, a complicated 
mathematical problem must be solved. A correct 
solution must be confirmed by members of the 
community. As each group (or “block”) of 
transfers is confirmed, it is added to the chain of 
all transactions, and the updated ledger is kept by 
each member of the community. It is the public 
nature of the ledger, and the fact that transactions 
must be confirmed, that prevents the introduction 
of a counterfeit transfer into the structure. 
Because maintaining the honesty of the system 
depends on solving mathematical problems, 
those that find solutions (miners) are given a 
reward. In the bitcoin system, as in many other 
blockchain systems, the reward consists of a unit 
of the property that is recorded in the ledger — in 
this case, a newly minted bitcoin.
One possible flaw in this system is that a 
group could obtain sufficient voting power to 
approve a transaction that transfers assets to 
them. This “51-percent attack” is combated by 
having a sufficiently large group of persons in the 
blockchain’s community reviewing and 
confirming transactions.7
B. Smart Contracts
The system described above is relatively 
simple, to the extent that it deals only with 
transfers of assets from one person to another. But 
the blockchain can also be used to record more 
4
See, e.g., Vitalik Buterin, “Bootstrappping a Decentralized 
Autonomous Corporation: Part I” (Sept. 19, 2013); and Buterin, “DAOs, 
DACs, DAs, and More: An Incomplete Terminology Guide” (May 6, 
2014). As a matter of terminology, the DAOs I discuss in this report are 
ones, like The DAO, that are most like a corporation, making 
distributions and allowing owners to obtain their investment in return 
from the entity.
5
E.g., SolarDAO (its white paper describes the proposed project and 
notes that it plans “to keep data on shareholders in a smart contract on 
Ethereum”); DAOStack; Wings; XWIN (not offered to U.S. persons); 
and ETF Token. Not all entities that identify as DAOs are using the 
blockchain structure to keep track of their investors. See, e.g., Databroker 
DAO white paper (“Databroker DAO will be run using a traditional 
company structure, until such a time we, in active collaboration with the 
community and industry, can determine a governance model that works 
for all parties involved.”).
6
The description of Bitcoin, and the innovative blockchain structure 
on which bitcoin is run, was set forth in the pseudonymous paper, 
Satoshi Nakamoto, “Bitcoin: A Peer-To-Peer Electronic Cash System” 
(Oct. 31, 2008).
7
See Jan Hendrik Witte, “The Blockchain: A Gentle Introduction” 
(Nov. 2016). Depending on the blockchain’s rules, this problem does not 
necessarily arise at a 51 percent ownership level.
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complicated transactions: those effected through 
smart contracts.
A smart contract is one whose terms are 
reflected in a computer program or, more 
generally, in a machine. All provisions, including 
execution and enforcement, are carried out 
automatically and without human intervention. It 
was early described in the simple context of a 
vending machine.8 When you put money into a 
vending machine and buy a bottle of soda, the 
seller is not around to confirm your purchase. The 
seller has simply set up its machine so that it 
recognizes when sufficient funds have been 
deposited to allow for the release of a container of 
soda and any change owed you.
But the current state of smart contracts goes 
well beyond that. For example, it allows two 
parties to set up their computers so that the 
buyer’s computer issues an order to purchase an 
item, and the seller’s computer causes the item to 
be sent on its way without further intervention by 
the seller. For example, if a company kept its 
supply of paper so that it could mechanically 
determine when the supply was running low, its 
computer could issue an order to an office supply 
company for more paper, without any employee 
of the buyer necessarily being aware that the 
order had been placed. The office supply 
company’s computer could cause a shipment of 
paper to be made to the buyer with no conscious 
intervention of any employees.
C. The Ethereum Platform
The Ethereum platform is a blockchain 
platform created with flexibility to allow for smart 
contracts. For our purposes, we need only 
appreciate an example of its application in The 
DAO transaction. The DAO structure allowed 
persons to transfer Ether (the Ethereum 
cryptocurrency, similar to bitcoin) to The DAO in 
exchange for The DAO tokens — items that were 
ownership interests in The DAO. Token owners 
voted to choose the investments to be made by 
The DAO and shared ratably in gains and losses 
of The DAO.9 Each token was recorded in the 
blockchain. The intention was that the collected 
funds would be invested in start-up companies. A 
proposal brought to The DAO would be voted on 
by the holders of The DAO tokens. If enough 
holders approved of the investment, the 
investment would be made by transferring Ether 
from The DAO’s account to the account of the 
successful applicant.10 Those who didn’t approve 
of the investment could choose to take their 
remaining Ether, leave The DAO’s main 
blockchain and collect their Ether, or create 
another blockchain. Besides their Ether, those 
who moved to the new blockchain would also 
receive “reward tokens.” Holders of the reward 
tokens would receive from The DAO their 
allocable portion of any distributions that The 
DAO received from investments made while the 
members of the new blockchain were still 
members of the original blockchain of The DAO, 
and from the proceeds of the disposition of those 
earlier investments. All of this — the tallying of 
the votes, the creation of a new blockchain, any 
distributions to disapproving holders, the 
investment of funds with successful applicants — 
could be effected through smart contracts, 
without the need for human intervention on 
behalf of The DAO. In its implementation, The 
DAO also made use of human “curators” who 
confirmed the identity of those who submitted 
proposals.
8
See Nick Szabo, “Formalizing and Securing Relationships on Public 
Networks,” First Monday, Sept. 1, 1997, discussed in Kevin Werbach and 
Nicolas Cornell, “Contracts Ex Machina,” 67 Duke L.J. 313 (2017).
9
They did not exercise any control over leadership of The DAO (like 
voting for the board of directors of a corporation) because The DAO’s 
structure did not include any leadership positions.
10
The description of the operation of The DAO in this paragraph 
comes from its formal presentation in Jentzsch, “Decentralized 
Autonomous Organization to Automate Governance (Final Draft)” and 
Stephen Tual, “On DAO Contractors and Curators,” Slock.it blog, Apr. 9, 
2016. Note that voting was based on the number of DAO tokens owned. 
Some have questioned whether it might be more democratic if each 
holder had only one vote. See, e.g., Haseeb Qureshi, “Blockchains Should 
Not Be Democracies,” Hacker Noon (Apr. 26, 2018); Muhammad Mehar 
et al., “Understanding a Revolutionary and Flawed Grand Experiment in 
Blockchain: The DAO Attack” (Nov. 26, 2017). This issue is analogous to 
controversies that exist regarding the proper rules for voting in a 
cooperative. See David J. Shakow, “From Rochdale Principles to LLCs: 
The Ongoing Evolution of the Cooperative Structure,” Tax Notes, Aug. 2, 
2004, p. 535.
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D. Blockchain Forks
A fork is created whenever the rules 
governing the blockchain are changed. If the 
change is made through a “soft fork,” a single 
blockchain will remain, although some users may 
continue using the old rules and won’t make use 
of the features in the new software. If the change 
is a “hard fork,” the result could be two 
blockchains where one existed before, unless 
everyone adopts the changed software. The 
transactions that occurred before the hard fork 
will be found on both blockchains. The hope and 
expectation of those introducing the change that 
leads to a hard fork is that holders will stop using 
the older prong. However, as a practical matter, if 
both blockchains remain active, anyone who held 
an asset on the blockchain before the hard fork 
will end up with two assets, one on each prong of 
the forked blockchain.11
E. Decentralized Autonomous Organization
As the above explanation hopefully makes 
clear, a DAO is decentralized because control over 
its operations does not reside in one place. It is 
autonomous because the smart contracts that 
govern its operation, when they operate properly, 
control the operation of the entity without the 
need for human intervention on behalf of the 
DAO. And, as the name suggests, it is a form of 
organization. The DAO was an early attempt to 
implement a DAO structure. Although it 
ultimately failed, it is useful to study because the 
details of its intended operation were clearly 
described.
III. Why The DAO Failed
This grand experiment, which accumulated 
more than $150 million from more than 11,000 
investors,12 failed because of a programming error. 
As noted above, anyone who disapproved of an 
investment had the right to withdraw from The 
DAO. Because of the programming error, The 
DAO, on its books, did not immediately reduce 
the account of an investor making a withdrawal. 
As a result, it was possible to make multiple 
withdrawals of the same amount of Ether from an 
ownership account in The DAO, and a rogue 
investor did just that.13
When those observing The DAO’s operations 
realized that much of its funds had been diverted, 
two options presented themselves.14 On one hand, 
this massive withdrawal of funds could be left 
alone. A significant and vocal minority of The 
DAO investors were in favor of this alternative. 
The reason was that, as a matter of principle, these 
investors believed strongly that anyone investing 
in The DAO had to accept that the rules governing 
its transactions would be precisely what was in 
the computer code in The DAO’s programs. 
Accordingly, a token holder’s ability to withdraw 
more funds than it had invested was simply 
another risk that investors necessarily had to 
accept, just as they would have to accept that an 
investment agreed upon might not be successful. 
This is characterized as a holding that “code is 
law.”15
The possibility that persons whose 
investments had essentially been stolen would 
support the position of the thief will seem 
inconceivable to those who do not appreciate the 
devotion of some to the idea that cyberspace 
should operate without intervention from outside 
authorities.16 In any event, when the theft was 
discovered, a group of Robin Hoods who realized 
11
For a more technical explanation, see Noelle Acheson, “Hard Fork 
vs. Soft Fork,” CoinDesk, Mar. 6, 2018.
12
David Siegel, “Understanding The DAO Hack for Journalists,” 
Medium (June 16, 2016). The dollar amounts reported for this project 
vary in different accounts depending on when the Ethers are translated 
into dollars.
13
See Emin Gün Sirer, “Thoughts on The DAO Hack,” Hacking 
Distributed (June 17, 2016).
14
The computer code controlling DAO tokens prevented the rogue 
investor from using the diverted tokens for 27 days, which gave time for 
the alternatives discussed below to be debated. See Stephan Tual, “DAO 
Security Advisory: Live Updates,” Slock.it blog, June 17, 2016.
15
The term comes from Lawrence Lessig, Code: And Other Laws of 
Cyberspace 5 (2006) (footnotes omitted):
In real space, we recognize how laws regulate — through 
constitutions, statutes, and other legal codes. In cyberspace we 
must understand how a different “code” regulates — how the 
software and hardware (i.e., the “code” of cyberspace) that make 
cyberspace what it is also regulate cyberspace as it is. As William 
Mitchell puts it, this code is cyberspace’s “law.” “Lex Informatica,” 
as Joel Reidenberg first put it, or better, “code is law.”
A post in the name of the anonymous investor who had withdrawn 
the funds apparently adopted this “code is law” view and took umbrage 
at being characterized as a thief. See “Letter From ‘The Attacker,’” June 
18, 2016. An analogous issue in the tax law is whether “substance” 
should govern when a transaction seems to follow the form described in 
the statute. See Joseph Isenbergh, “Musings on Form and Substance in 
Taxation,” 49 U. Chi. L. Rev. 859 (1982). To prevent confusion among tax 
practitioners reading this, the reference to “code” here is to computer 
code, not the IRC.
16
See Lessig, supra note 15, passim.
For more Tax Notes content, please visit www.taxnotes.com. 
 
©
 2018 Tax Analysts. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim
 copyright in any public dom
ain or third party content.
SPECIAL REPORT
TAX NOTES, AUGUST 13, 2018  933
what was happening diverted The DAO’s 
remaining Ether to a safe place for the benefit of 
the other investors before anyone else could get 
control of them.17
Ultimately, this problem could be fixed only 
through actions taken on the Ethereum 
blockchain. The vast majority of those who 
expressed their opinions wanted to undo the 
theft. They voted for another option: the creation 
of a hard fork of the Ethereum blockchain. As 
noted, it is practically impossible for anyone to 
introduce a counterfeit transaction into a 
blockchain because the blockchain community 
must approve of a new transaction, and a 
counterfeit transaction would not pass muster 
under this system. However, the community can 
choose to disregard a host of transactions by 
simply agreeing to ignore the portion of the 
blockchain that contains the disapproved 
transactions.
That is what happened here. Almost 90 
percent of those in the Ethereum blockchain who 
voted were in favor of rolling back the blockchain 
to before the point at which the rogue investor 
began transferring tokens to its account.18 The 
Ethereum miners (the only ones who could 
actually effect a change) then agreed to follow the 
request of the Ethereum Foundation and upgrade 
the Ethereum software. That created a hard fork 
in the blockchain. One prong included the 
transactions from the point that the rogue 
investor’s activities began, plus any other 
transactions that might follow this path after the 
hard fork occurred. The other prong did not 
include those transactions, instead functioning as 
if all transactions in the portion of the original 
blockchain that included the rogue investor’s 
transactions never took place. It was anticipated 
that most people using Ether would follow this 
second prong.19
The investors in The DAO could not 
themselves generate this solution. Creating a hard 
fork in the Ethereum blockchain was a decision 
that had to be made by those in the Ethereum 
community. What probably influenced that 
decision was that The DAO had accumulated 
about 14 percent of all outstanding Ether in its 
successful fundraising.20 Once the fork was 
created, The DAO investors were able to retrieve 
their investments and The DAO ceased to 
function.
However, because not everyone agreed to the 
solution, both blockchains (recording ownership 
of Ether) remained active. While the new 
blockchain became the one most investors looked 
to, the old blockchain continued to be used. Thus, 
anyone holding Ether from before the time of the 
hard fork ended up with two assets instead of one: 
Ether on the new blockchain and Ether on the old 
blockchain (called Ethereum Classic).21 Although 
Ethereum Classic is not as valuable as Ether on the 
new blockchain, it became an additional asset of 
those who held Ether before the hard fork 
occurred.22
Creating the hard fork disappointed those 
who felt that code, once set out, is unalterable. 
Indeed, discussions of smart contracts emphasize 
that they have no flexibility because they lack 
safety valves that an outside review would 
provide.23 But as the solution to the problem 
created by The DAO shows, a safety valve can be 
17
Jentzsch, supra note 1.
18
Antonio Madeira, “The DAO, the Hack, the Soft Fork and the Hard 
Fork” (May 20, 2018). The significance of this overwhelming support for 
the hard fork is undercut by the fact that only 4.5 percent of Ether (not 
Ether holders) were voted at all, and apparently, holders of large blocks of 
Ether played a major role: One voter cast more votes in favor than all the 
votes cast against. See Vitalik Buterin, “Notes on Blockchain 
Governance” (Dec. 17, 2017).
19
Pete Rizzo, “Ethereum Hard Fork Creates Competing Currencies,” 
CoinDesk, July 24, 2016 (describing how the transactions using the old 
prong, called Ethereum Classic, unexpectedly gained some value).
20
Klint Finley, “A $50 Million Hack Just Showed That The DAO Was 
All Too Human,” Wired, June 18, 2016; Siegel, supra note 12 (suggesting 
that from the standpoint of the Ethereum blockchain, The DAO was “too 
big to fail”).
21
Alyssa Hertig, “Ethereum’s Two Ethereums Explained” (July 28, 
2016).
22
The tax result of such a hard fork might be additional income. See 
discussion in American Bar Association Section of Taxation, “ABA Tax 
Section Offers Suggestions for Cryptocurrency Guidance” (Mar. 20, 
2018). The ABA tax section suggested that as an administrative matter, 
hard forks occurring in 2017 (which would not include The DAO hard 
fork) be treated as taxable events, but with an amount realized of zero. 
This would have the effect of making the new assets generated by a hard 
fork capital assets with a zero basis for most taxpayers, and would defer 
income recognition regarding those assets to the time those assets were 
disposed of. The American Institute of CPAs argued that no income 
should be recognized because the additional asset received in the case of 
a hard fork is unsolicited and extremely difficult to value. See AICPA, 
“AICPA Seeks Updated Guidance on Tax Treatment of Virtual 
Currency” (May 30, 2018) (section 6 of comment letter to IRS). The 
practical result of this suggestion would seem to be the same as for the 
ABA’s.
23
E.g., Jeremy Sklaroff, “Smart Contracts and the Cost of 
Inflexibility,” 166 U. Pa. L. Rev. 263 (2017); R. Polk Wagner, “On Software 
Regulation,” 78 S. Cal. L. Rev. 457, 462-463 (2005).
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found by using what is in effect a 51 percent attack 
that those on the blockchain can agree to. The 
hard fork used in the context of The DAO was an 
extreme measure. But any change in the operation 
of the blockchain left open by the blockchain’s 
code that the community can agree to is available 
as a backstop to unexpected applications of the 
original code.
Note that the post hoc change in rules that was 
applied in The DAO situation is not unique to the 
blockchain world. It has been argued that the 
same type of solution was used at the end of the 
tulip craze in the 1600s. The rules governing 
delivery under tulip contracts were changed so 
that those committed by contract to buy tulips (at 
extraordinarily high prices) could satisfy their 
obligation by paying only 3.5 percent of the 
contract price.24 Similarly, when Nelson Bunker 
Hunt and William Herbert Hunt accumulated 
substantial amounts of silver and contracts for the 
delivery of silver (arguably setting up a corner of 
the silver futures market), the commodity 
exchanges simply changed their rules, ultimately 
resulting in a substantial reduction of the Hunts’ 
wealth. It has been suggested that some of those 
who made those decisions profited from the 
change in the rules.25 This element of self-interest 
may have played a role in the hard fork that saved 
The DAO investors.26
IV. The SEC’s Decision on The DAO
Long after The DAO ceased functioning, the 
SEC considered the treatment of The DAO’s 
tokens under the securities laws.27 Its release 
alerted those issuing blockchain-based tokens to 
the SEC’s general views on these assets. 
According to the SEC’s reasoning, a security 
includes an investment contract, which is an 
investment of money in a common enterprise 
with a reasonable expectation of profits from the 
efforts of others. Although the purchasers of The 
DAO tokens could vote on proposals presented to 
them, they were relying on the persons who 
developed the structure and on the curators who 
selected the proposals for them to vote on.28 
Because of the wide dispersion of ownership of 
The DAO tokens and the anonymity of their 
owners, the SEC concluded that the voting rights 
granted to these ownership interests were “akin 
to those of a corporate shareholder.” It followed 
that interests like The DAO tokens normally 
require registration under the securities laws.29
V. First Tax Issue: Classification
The organizers of The DAO were very 
concerned about their possible liability to 
investors. Thus, there is language throughout the 
documents that describe The DAO to potential 
investors emphasizing that no “legally binding 
contract” was created through the investment.30 
This was presumably intended to rebut any 
claims that those who developed The DAO might 
be responsible for any losses the investors 
incurred.31 But it also suggests that while a DAO is 
called an “organization,” its developers thought it 
might not have any formal character for local law 
purposes.
However, a surprising aspect of analyzing any 
DAO for tax purposes (to someone not a tax 
practitioner) is that it can be a tax entity. In some 
sense, it appears like a disembodied creation 
24
This rule was adopted in the Dutch city of Haarlem and reportedly 
in many other cities. Peter M. Garber, Famous First Bubbles: The 
Fundamentals of Early Manias 62 (2000).
25
Jeffrey Williams, Manipulation on Trial: Economic Analysis and the 
Hunt Silver Case 52-54 (1995). Professor Williams worked as an expert for 
the defendant in a case arising from the activities of the Hunts, Minpeco 
SA v. Hunt, 718 F. Supp. 168 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). The author of this report 
served as an expert for the plaintiff.
26
Siegel, supra note 12 (“It may be noted that several people from the 
Ethereum Foundation are DAO token holders and also have advisory 
positions in The DAO.”).
27
SEC Release No. 81207, supra note 3.
28
In a generally critical review of the SEC’s analysis, Professor 
Randolph Robinson points out that Slock.it, the entity that created The 
DAO, played no continuing role in its operation, and that the curators 
were explicitly enjoined not to play a role in evaluating the proposals in 
any way. Robinson, “The New Digital Wild West: Regulating the 
Explosion of Initial Coin Offerings,” University of Denver Sturm College 
of Law Working Paper No. 18-01, at 42-43 (Sept. 1, 2017).
29
In testimony in February, SEC Chair Jay Clayton said that “by and 
large, the structures of [initial coin offerings (ICOs)] that I have seen 
involve the offer and sale of securities and directly implicate the 
securities registration requirements and other investor protection 
provisions of our federal securities laws.” Testimony of Clayton before 
the Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee, 
“Chairman’s Testimony on Virtual Currencies: The Roles of the SEC and 
CFTC” (Feb. 6, 2018). I discussed the tax treatment of holders of tokens 
issued in ICOs in Shakow, “The Tax Treatment of Tokens: What Does It 
Betoken,” Tax Notes, Sept. 11, 2017, p. 1387.
30
See “Additional Disclaimers” in “The Decentralized Autonomous 
Organization (DAO) Framework.”
31
Quinn DuPont, “Experiments in Algorithmic Governance: A 
History and Ethnography of ‘The DAO,’ a Failed Decentralized 
Autonomous Organization,” Bitcoin and Beyond: Cryptocurrencies, 
Blockchains and Global Governance 157, 163 (2018).
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floating in cyberspace, with no apparent form. Yet 
as The DAO’s short history makes clear, the group 
of investors in The DAO intended to consult 
together to decide on investments, to make the 
investments, and to share in the profits. They, and 
those on the Ethereum blockchain, ultimately 
worked together to resolve the problem created 
by the rogue investor. Despite the disclaimers in 
the material presenting The DAO to potential 
investors, the structure operated very much like a 
contract.32 Effectively, the computer code 
governing the operation of The DAO was the 
contract. Remember that no change was made in 
the rules governing the operation of The DAO in 
order to thwart the plan of the rogue investor. 
Rather, a change was made in the operation of the 
Ethereum blockchain by creating a hard fork in 
that blockchain. And the possibility of a hard fork 
was inherent in the rules governing the operation 
of the Ethereum blockchain.33
In determining the status of The DAO for tax 
purposes, classification for local law purposes is 
not relevant (even assuming that the quoted 
language about no legally binding contract had its 
desired effect). In determining whether the 
agreements entered into in creating The DAO, or 
any similar entity, result in an entity for tax 
purposes, the regulations state:
Whether an organization is an entity 
separate from its owners for federal tax 
purposes is a matter of federal tax law and 
does not depend on whether the 
organization is recognized as an entity 
under local law.34
The regulations go on to state what makes an 
organization an entity separate from its owners:
A joint venture or other contractual 
arrangement may create a separate entity 
for federal tax purposes if the participants 
carry on a trade, business, financial 
operation, or venture and divide the 
profits therefrom.35
Those regulations simply echo the language of 
the statute:
The term “partnership” includes a 
syndicate, group, pool, joint venture, or 
other unincorporated organization 
through or by means of which any 
business, financial operation, or venture is 
carried on, and which is not, within the 
meaning of this title, a corporation or a 
trust or estate.36
Case law does not require much formality to 
create a partnership for tax purposes. In Podell,37 
an oral agreement under which a taxpayer 
supplied funds to allow another person to 
rehabilitate homes, after which the two divided 
the profits, was treated as a partnership. In 
Bergford,38 taxpayers who were formally merely 
co-owners of computer equipment were deemed 
to be in a partnership with the manager of the 
sale-leaseback program through which they 
bought the equipment. The Court of Appeals 
accepted the Tax Court’s conclusion that “the 
economic benefits to the individual participants 
were not derivative of their coownership of the 
computer equipment, but rather came from their 
joint relationship toward a common goal.” 
Similarly here, the significance of holding an 
interest in The DAO was the ability to vote on the 
proposals brought to the attention of The DAO 
and to share in any profits generated by the 
32
Analyses of the relationship between smart contracts and 
conventional contract law generally conclude that parties governed by 
smart contracts are likely tied to the terms of the agreement at least as 
strongly as those entering conventional contracts. See Sklaroff, supra note 
23 (smart contracts more rigid than other contracts); Mark Flood and 
Oliver Goodenough, “Contract as Automaton: The Computational 
Representation of Financial Agreements,” OFR Working Paper 15-04 
(Mar. 26, 2015) (a well-written contract can be made to function like a 
contract a computer could work with); Werbach and Cornell, supra note 
8, at 343 (“smart contracts are contracts”); but see Lauren Henry Scholz, 
“Algorithmic Contracts,” 20 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 128, 151 (2017) (there is a 
very strong argument that arrangements like The DAO are not 
enforceable).
33
This was reflected in a post purportedly from the rogue investor, 
which argued against the creation of a hard fork because it would harm 
the market value of Ether. See letter, supra note 15. The post did not argue 
that this change could not be made.
34
Reg. section 301.7701-1(a)(1). See, e.g., Alhouse v. Commissioner, T.C. 
Memo. 1991-652, aff’d sub nom. Bergford v. Commissioner, 12 F.3d 166 (9th 
Cir. 1993); Luna v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 1067, 1077-1078 (1964).
35
Reg. section 301.7701-1(a)(2).
36
Sections 761(a) and 7701(a)(2).
37
Podell v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 429 (1970).
38
Bergford v. Commissioner, 12 F.3d 166, 169 (9th Cir. 1993). It should be 
noted that the tax law will find an arrangement to be a partnership when 
securities law might not. Thus, the SEC’s release on The DAO, supra note 
3, concluded that The DAO was not a partnership because “the 
pseudonymity and dispersion of the DAO Token holders made it 
difficult for them to join together to effect change or to exercise 
meaningful control.” The SEC’s analysis would not lead to a conclusion 
that there was a partnership under the facts of Bergford.
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investment of the funds that were under the 
control of the holders of The DAO tokens.
It is clear that The DAO, a group of investors 
that intended to review investment proposals and 
invest in some of the proposed ventures, was 
carrying on a business or financial operation with 
the intention of dividing the profits therefrom 
with the others who invested in The DAO. The 
DAO was expected to provide capital to chosen 
investments, and those who bought into The DAO 
were promised a share of any resulting profits. As 
the effects of the diversion of Ether from The 
DAO’s account showed, the investors would also 
share in the losses of The DAO. All these 
arrangements were inherent in the software 
under which The DAO operated. It is worth 
emphasizing that although it was a change in the 
structure of Ethereum and the Ether issued 
through it that frustrated much of the rogue 
investor’s plans, if a change in the operation of 
The DAO itself could have been made, it would 
not change the analysis. Such a change is inherent 
in the blockchain structure to the extent it allows 
for soft forks and hard forks. Analogously, the 
agreements governing the organization and 
operation of a corporation or partnership are 
subject to amendment, within the parameters of 
the documents and local law.
Some recent cases have required that there be 
significant sharing of income and losses to 
support partner status.39 That position has been 
strongly questioned.40 However, in a DAO, all 
those contributing capital share proportionately 
in the income and losses of the enterprise. Those 
who invested Ether in The DAO were certainly in 
a position to share the losses of the enterprise, as 
became clear when the programming error in the 
arrangement was exploited to potentially deplete 
one-third of the money invested.
There are arrangements that do not rise to the 
level of being a partnership, but The DAO’s 
activities went beyond those exceptions. The 
regulations exclude from being a partnership “a 
joint undertaking, merely to share expenses” or 
“mere co-ownership of property that is 
maintained, kept in repair, and rented or leased.” 
Those phrases do not describe The DAO. Also, 
The DAO is not a trust for tax purposes because a 
trust is an arrangement “whereby trustees take 
title to property for the purpose of protecting or 
conserving it for the beneficiaries under the 
ordinary rules applied in chancery or probate 
courts.” The DAO was not expected merely to 
preserve the funds invested in it. Moreover, the 
beneficiaries of a trust “do no more than accept 
the benefits thereof and are not the voluntary 
planners or creators of the trust arrangement.”41 In 
contrast, the investors in The DAO were to be 
actively involved in The DAO’s decision-
making.42
That The DAO should be treated as an entity 
for tax purposes does not suggest that all 
blockchain-based assets are ownership interests 
in tax entities. Pure cryptocurrencies, like bitcoin, 
are based on a blockchain structure, but they do 
not reflect an ownership interest in any entity. 
Investors in bitcoin are looking for profits solely 
from a change in the value of bitcoin. There is no 
underlying entity whose profits will affect the 
value of bitcoin. And as I have discussed at length 
elsewhere, many tokens issued in initial coin 
offerings are not interests in the issuing entity.43
But The DAO was an entity for tax purposes. 
An entity like The DAO that was not organized 
explicitly as a corporation could normally choose 
to be treated either as a partnership or as a 
corporation for federal income tax purposes.44 
However, partnership classification is not 
available for an entity that is classified as a 
“publicly traded partnership.”45 A publicly traded 
partnership is one whose interests are either 
traded on an “established securities market” or 
“are readily tradable on a secondary market (or 
the substantial equivalent thereof).” Interests in 
entities like The DAO can be bought and sold on 
exchanges. The IRS has not ruled on whether such 
exchanges are either “established securities 
39
See, e.g., TIFD III-E v. United States, 459 F.3d 220 (2d Cir. 2006).
40
McKee, Nelson, and Whitmire, Federal Taxation of Partnerships & 
Partners, para. 3.02 (1996).
41
Both quotations are from reg. section 301.7701-4(a).
42
This activity would not usually rise to the level of “material 
participation” for purposes of the passive loss rules of section 469. See 
reg. section 1.469-5T.
43
Shakow, supra note 29.
44
Reg. section 301.7701-2(b) and -3(a).
45
Section 7704.
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markets” or “secondary markets (or the 
substantial equivalent thereof).”46
In any event, operating a DAO either as a 
corporation or as a partnership will not mesh 
easily with the rules of the IRC. There would have 
been significant tax liabilities if The DAO had 
operated as planned. Every investment made by 
The DAO when it transferred Ether to a successful 
applicant would be a taxable event to the DAO.47 
Any income earned from investments would be 
either taxable to The DAO as a corporation or 
taxable to its investors as a partnership. And any 
time disgruntled investors who disapproved of an 
investment withdrew from The DAO into a new 
blockchain, taking their Ether and reward tokens 
with them, there would be liquidating 
distributions with tax consequences — both to the 
entity and to the investors — that would have to 
be determined. If The DAO is a U.S. taxpayer, it 
will have to file a tax return and alert its owners to 
any taxable income they have.
The obvious problem with applying those 
conclusions in the real world is that the pure 
blockchain structure intentionally omits a central 
authority playing any role in its ongoing 
operation. If a DAO is truly “autonomous,” those 
who developed it and promoted it no longer have 
any power to control it. Thus, in a DAO 
blockchain, there is no one responsible for filing 
the forms and returns needed by the tax system. 
There is no one to file corporate or partnership tax 
returns with the IRS; there is no one to furnish 
forms K-1 or 1099 to the owners to inform them of 
their income from the entities; and there is no one 
to withhold from any payments made to owners48 
(or, indeed, if it is appropriate,49 to withhold from 
payments made to the miners, without whom the 
blockchain would not be maintained). If forms are 
not filed and amounts are not withheld, who will 
be responsible for making the resulting payments 
and paying any penalties that the IRS will levy?50
The most straightforward answer is that the 
pure blockchain form does not work well for an 
entity under the IRC. This fact was recognized by 
the company Overstock.com, which issued 
conventional stock using a blockchain structure. 
Recognizing that it would have to comply with 
SEC requirements (and, presumably, IRS 
requirements), it used a blockchain structure that 
included an entity, Overstock.com itself, that 
could monitor and identify the actual owners of 
its stock.51 Overstock.com would file its own tax 
returns and furnish to stockholders, all of which it 
could identify, the appropriate tax forms 
reflecting such things as dividends paid to the 
owners.
It would seem that any entity located in the 
United States52 should use that type of structure in 
46
In his testimony in February, SEC Chair Clayton noted significant 
differences between cryptocurrency exchanges and more traditional 
exchanges. See testimony, supra note 29. A discussion of the different 
services cryptocurrency exchanges may provide can be found in James 
R. Brown and Franziska Hertel, “Virtual Currencies and the Commodity 
Trading Safe Harbor,” Tax Notes, June 18, 2018, p. 1731.
47
Notice 2014-21, 2014-16 IRB 938, section 4, Q-6 (exchange of virtual 
currency for another asset is a taxable disposition of the virtual 
currency).
48
A white paper of one DAO, ETF, supra note 5, recognizes the 
potential for tax liabilities arising from its operations. The project tries to 
avoid problems at the entity level by stating:
The Association’s tax affairs will be dealt with according to the law 
of the land at the individual level, operating as a pass-through 
entity with each token holder paying taxes in their local jurisdiction 
relative to their own gains or losses.
ETF white paper, at 51. It characterizes its own legal status as follows:
The Association is a body corporate with its own legal identity. It is 
separate from its office-bearers and token holders. The Association 
will continue to exist even if the token holders change. The 
association exists online and is governed in a digital jurisdiction for 
managing decentralized autonomous organizations.
ETF white paper, at 50. As suggested in Section VI, operating in a digital 
jurisdiction may not protect it from the Foreign Account Tax Compliance 
Act rules.
49
Because the miners are working to maintain the blockchain, they 
probably aren’t being paid by the entity making use of the Ether on the 
blockchain. Whether a currency blockchain like bitcoin’s, which is not an 
entity, can have any obligation to withhold on payments made to miners 
is not considered here.
50
If the entity is a partnership, it will almost surely be subject to the 
new partnership audit rules, sections 6221 through 6241, either because 
it has more than 100 partners (section 6221(b)(1)(B)) or because it cannot 
show that all its partners fit the description in section 6221(b)(1)(C). This 
will result in more obligations and liabilities of the entity.
51
The S-3 registration statement says:
The personal identity information necessary to associate a public 
key representing a given block of digital securities with the owner 
of those securities will be maintained in a proprietary ledger 
system that is not exposed to the public.
52
See the discussion in Section VII regarding the question of whether 
the phrase “located in the United States” has any meaning in this 
context.
For more Tax Notes content, please visit www.taxnotes.com. 
 
©
 2018 Tax Analysts. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim
 copyright in any public dom
ain or third party content.
SPECIAL REPORT
938  TAX NOTES, AUGUST 13, 2018
order to comply with IRC requirements. What 
about an entity that is not located in the United 
States? A foreign corporation or partnership not 
within the jurisdiction of the United States cannot 
be required to file forms that conform with IRC 
requirements. However, owners of such entities 
who are U.S. taxpayers must still obtain the 
information they need to properly complete their 
own tax returns. This would be especially 
important if the DAO were a partnership, because 
a partner must include its share of income on its 
tax return, even if the income has not yet been 
distributed to the partner.53 A U.S. investor who 
plans to comply with the tax law would be wise to 
ensure that it will get that information before 
entering into this type of investment.
VI. Second Tax Issue: FATCA
But there is another potential problem in the 
case of any DAO that is located outside the United 
States and is not subject to U.S. jurisdiction. To 
prevent U.S. taxpayers from hiding their assets 
overseas, the United States has developed rules 
under the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act.54 
FATCA requires entities that may be dealing with 
U.S. taxpayers to report information about those 
taxpayers and their financial transactions to the 
IRS. If they fail to do so, any payment made to 
them becomes subject to an automatic 30 percent 
withholding tax that must be collected by anyone 
making payments to those entities.55
It would appear that a DAO would be a 
foreign financial institution under FATCA.56 The 
IRC includes as a financial institution an entity 
engaged in investing in securities or partnership 
interests.57 The IRS includes within that category 
“private equity and venture capital funds.”58 A 
foreign entity organized like The DAO would 
seem to fit that description. That would be true of 
any DAO whose goal was to invest the funds it 
receives from its investors. Hence, if it were not a 
U.S. entity, it would be an FFI.
An FFI is encouraged to enter into an 
agreement with the IRS. Under the agreement, the 
FFI commits to identifying whether its account 
holders are U.S. taxpayers and to supplying 
information to the IRS regarding payments to 
those taxpayers. If it cannot determine whether an 
account holder is a U.S. taxpayer, it must 
withhold 30 percent from any payment to that 
account holder. Given the anonymity of the 
blockchain, a DAO that enters into an agreement 
with the IRS would be withholding on any 
payment made to an account holder that did not 
properly identify itself to the entity.
If an FFI does not enter into an agreement with 
the IRS, any payment of interest or dividends59 to 
the nonparticipating FFI by a U.S. person (or by a 
participating FFI) must have 30 percent withheld 
from it.60 Thirty percent withholding is also 
required from the gross proceeds of the sale by the 
nonparticipating FFI of an interest that can 
produce U.S.-source interest or dividends.61 Thus, 
the nonparticipating FFI would have 30 percent of 
its proceeds of any sale of stock in an investment 
withheld if it sold the interest to a U.S. entity or 
one that had an FFI agreement with the IRS.62 This 
would cover many potential buyers.
If an entity like The DAO does not qualify as 
an FFI, it would be a nonfinancial foreign entity 
(NFFE). In general, payments to NFFEs made by a 
U.S. entity or a participating FFI are subject to 30 
percent withholding. The NFFE can avoid such 
withholding only if it can represent to the payer 
53
Section 702(c).
54
Sections 1471 through 1474. I do not discuss the question of 
whether a taxpayer owning an interest in a DAO would be treated as 
owning a foreign asset, with possible reporting requirements under the 
foreign bank account reporting rules and for purposes of Form 8938. For 
a recent discussion of that issue, see ABA, “ABA Members Submit 
Comments on Voluntary Compliance Programs” (May 3, 2018).
55
Sections 1471(a) and 1472(a).
56
The AICPA has suggested that centralized virtual currency 
exchanges located outside the United States would qualify as FFIs. 
Accordingly, someone whose virtual currency is held by the exchange 
could be required to report the holdings under the rules of FATCA and 
FBAR requirements. See AICPA letter, supra note 22, at section 12.
57
Section 1471(d)(5)(C).
58
Notice 2010-60, 2010-37 IRB 329, section II.A.3.
59
More precisely, U.S.-sourced fixed and determinable annual or 
periodic income, as defined in section 1473(1)(A)(i).
60
Section 1471(b)(1)(D)(i).
61
Section 1473(1)(A)(ii).
62
Reg. section 1.1473-1(a)(3)((ii)(A). It does not appear that the sale of 
a partnership interest would require withholding.
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that it has no substantial U.S. owners or it 
provides information about U.S. owners to the 
U.S. payer or FFI.63 A DAO would normally have 
difficulty making that representation.
It is worth noting that while ownership in a 
DAO is anonymous, a DAO that attempted to 
enforce tax-related requirements (for example, by 
asking its owners to reveal their identities) would 
have some power over uncooperative holders of 
their tokens. Given the centrality of anonymity in 
the blockchain structure, a DAO that had not 
adopted the Overstock.com structure might be 
reluctant to request identifying information from 
the holders of its tokens. However, to the extent a 
DAO was itself subject to any taxes or penalties, it 
could try to require its token holders to pay their 
proportional share of those payments. The rules 
governing a DAO could provide that a holder 
who did not cooperate with a request from the 
DAO (regarding a tax issue or anything else, for 
that matter) would lose its voting rights and the 
right to receive any distributions from the DAO. 
This is because while the holders of DAO tokens 
are anonymous, the addresses (that is, the 
locations on the blockchain) of those who can vote 
or receive distributions from a DAO must be 
known to the DAO — otherwise, it would not be 
possible to confirm their right to vote and their 
right to receive distributions.64 Presumably, if an 
address were blacklisted in terms of voting and 
receiving distributions,65 the transferee would also 
be subject to the same penalties until whatever 
caused the address to be penalized was corrected. 
This might mean that the DAO would have to 
provide a service to potential transferees 
confirming whether the token they plan to buy is 
limited in any way. Of course, adding these 
trappings of an organized entity would be 
somewhat inconsistent with the attempt to create 
a totally autonomous entity, but perhaps these 
procedures could be programmed in a smart 
contract so they would operate without human 
intervention.
VII. Enforcement
The reader may have noted one point missing 
from much of the above discussion: If a DAO 
retains the usual blockchain structure and does 
not keep a record of its owners, how are any tax 
liabilities enforced? After all, one of the beauties 
of the blockchain structure is that no one can 
identify who owns the assets listed on the 
blockchain.
A. Taxation of Owners
There are several levels of response to that 
question. First, many people file their tax returns 
honestly. The absence of a Form 1099 will not 
deter them from including appropriate income 
items on their tax returns.
Those who are tempted to ignore the income 
from a DAO operating with a standard 
blockchain may be encouraged by the fact that, 
unlike investors in Swiss bank accounts and the 
like, there is no danger of a whistleblower 
revealing their identity,66 because there is no 
central authority with a list of all the DAO’s 
investors.
However, as those who have failed to include 
their bitcoin (and other cryptocurrency) 
transactions on their tax returns have learned, the 
IRS can obtain records of exchanges when holders 
of blockchain currencies convert their holdings 
into fiat currencies — dollars and other 
conventional government-issued currencies.67 
This may encourage investors who wish to hide 
their income to use exchanges that are not subject 
to U.S. jurisdiction. It is unclear the extent to 
which other countries might cooperate with an 
attempt by the United States to obtain information 
from exchanges outside U.S. jurisdiction. Many 
countries are concerned with cryptocurrencies 
because of their potential to aid criminal 
activities.68 An ideal solution would involve 
international cooperation to obtain information 
from cryptocurrency exchanges. Absent such 
63
Section 1472(a) and (b).
64
See Jentzsch, supra note 10, at 2; and Madeira, supra note 18.
65
It is possible to “blacklist” items in a blockchain using a soft fork. 
See Siegel, supra note 12 (Vitalik Buterin of the Ethereum Foundation 
suggested using a soft fork in the Ethereum blockchain to blacklist the 
misappropriated Ether from The DAO).
66
See Bradley Birkenfeld, Lucifer’s Banker: The Untold Story of How I 
Destroyed Swiss Bank Secrecy (2016).
67
United States v. Coinbase Inc., No. 3:17-cv-01431 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
68
Irish Department of Finance, “Virtual Currencies and Blockchain 
Technology” (Mar. 23, 2018) (discusses countries that have formally 
banned bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies).
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cooperation, a FATCA-like solution might be 
developed to deter the use of foreign exchanges.
B. Taxation of the Entity
If DAOs begin to proliferate, they are likely to 
command the attention of the OECD project on 
base erosion and profit shifting.69 The 
international concern with base erosion is focused 
on “stateless income” — income that through 
sophisticated tax planning is not treated as 
income in any jurisdiction.70 If a DAO can 
successfully assert that it “exists online and is 
governed in a digital jurisdiction for managing 
decentralized autonomous organizations,”71 those 
trying to avoid all taxing jurisdictions will no 
longer need complicated structures to gain their 
desired result.
There is certainly a serious question about 
how an entity formed as a DAO can be located in 
any physical place. If a DAO adopts a structure 
like that of Overstock.com,72 the location of the 
entity that is in charge of that DAO may properly 
be referred to as the DAO’s location. But 
otherwise, identifying a location of a DAO may 
not be a meaningful exercise under our current 
rules of jurisdiction.73 I have previously written 
about the difficulty of identifying the location for 
tax purposes of items located in the cloud.74 But a 
cloud arrangement at least consists of a set of 
physical computer servers. A DAO is located in 
cyberspace, so that it could be viewed either as 
everywhere or nowhere. The German 
company Slock.it developed The DAO, but The 
DAO structure was intentionally removed from 
Slock.it’s ownership and made available to 
anyone who wanted to use that structure.75
The legal ramifications and treatment of an 
entity like The DAO have not been discussed 
much in the legal literature. Professor Lawrence 
Lessig distinguishes between the internet and 
cyberspace.76 Messages are sent on the internet; 
purchases are made on the internet. The messages 
are sent between entities that exist in the real 
world; the purchases are made from sellers who 
have a real-world existence. Much of the legal 
literature dealing with new technologies focuses 
on those interactions occurring over the internet. 
But The DAO itself existed nowhere other than in 
cyberspace. Its operations were carried out by 
means of its code. If you try to look for an entity 
like The DAO in the world, you will find that 
there is no there there. While its owners were real 
entities — however hard it might have been to 
identify them — and while The DAO’s 
investments would have been made in the real 
world, the entity itself existed only in cyberspace. 
Conventional analysis could not sensibly connect 
it to any one location on Earth.
The BEPS project is clearly focused on the 
digital economy.77 The possibility that there might 
be international cooperation under BEPS at all 
arose from the recognition of the serious loss of 
revenue to all countries because of sophisticated 
tax planning, among other things. If the DAO 
structure cannot fairly be located in any 
jurisdiction, it would seem to embody a classic 
generator of stateless income. A growth in the use 
of DAOs could well lead to international 
cooperation to tax the income of DAOs.
One way of getting some control over DAOs 
would be to insist that cryptocurrency exchanges 
make available the identities of those trading on 
them. To a significant degree, entities running 
wallet applications (where most cryptocurrency 
investors store their holdings) already require 
anti-money-laundering/know-your-customer 
checks upon sign-up.78 If all nations charged 
exchanges with the responsibility of knowing 
who their customers are, and customers trading 
on exchanges realized that their identities would 
69
Information about BEPS can be found at the OECD website.
70
See Edward D. Kleinbard, “Stateless Income,” 11 Fla. Tax Rev. 699 
(2011).
71
The language is from the ETF white paper, quoted in supra note 48.
72
See supra text accompanying note 51.
73
See generally David R. Johnson and David Post, “Law and Borders 
— The Rise of Law in Cyberspace,” 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1367 (1996); David G. 
Post, In Search of Jefferson’s Moose: Notes on the State of Cyberspace, ch. 11 
(2009).
74
Shakow, “The Taxation of Cloud Computing and Digital Content,” 
Tax Notes, July 22, 2013, p. 333.
75
Jentzsch, supra note 1. The SEC release, supra note 3, concluded that 
Slock.it retained significant effective influence over The DAO’s actions.
76
Lessig, supra note 15, at 9.
77
Action 1 of the BEPS project is called “Addressing the Tax 
Challenges of the Digital Economy.”
78
Kevin Werbach, The Blockchain and the New Architecture of Trust 179 
(2018) (coming).
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be made known to tax authorities, it would make 
hiding behind a blockchain more and more 
difficult. Whether such a level of international 
cooperation could be achieved is certainly 
unclear.
But this solution assumes that we can locate 
exchanges in a jurisdiction. If exchanges can 
themselves operate solely in cyberspace, with no 
connection to any jurisdiction, governments will 
need to find another way of dealing with the DAO 
phenomenon.
Another player that governments might be 
able to pursue would be an entity that was known 
to interact with a DAO.79 For example, The DAO 
planned to bring investment proposals to its 
owners, and to fund entities whose proposals the 
owners approved of. Profits would result from 
distributions from those entities and from gains 
on the disposition of those investments. Taxing 
authorities might require entities receiving those 
invested funds — assuming they operate outside 
of cyberspace — to withhold from payments 
going to any DAO that was not complying with 
tax reporting requirements. And if a DAO’s 
ownership interests in those entities were 
transferred on conventional exchanges, 
withholding could be applied to the proceeds of 
any sale of an interest by a noncomplying DAO. 
Again, that could only succeed with substantial 
international cooperation.
VIII. Conclusion
There is no evidence that entities structured 
like The DAO have considered the likelihood that 
they are subject to various requirements under the 
tax laws. The simple solution for those that want 
to comply would be to use blockchains like that of 
Overstock.com,80 which allow an outside entity to 
oversee the ownership registry of the DAO. If 
they fail to do so, they may find that they are 
subject to limitations under FATCA or may be 
subject to penalties imposed by the IRS and 
collected, if possible, from their owners. But there 
remains a significant possibility that absent 
international cooperation and innovation, it won’t 
be easy for tax administrators to discover who 
should be taxed on the income of a DAO. 
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